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Article 4

THE SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS DECISIONS -

A CRITIQUE

Theodore R. Mann* and Marvin Garfinkel**
Introduction
Abraham Braunfeld is an Orthodox Jew'who owns and operates a retail
children's clothing store. His store is open from Monday morning until midafternoon on Friday, at which time the Fourth Commandment requires that
he close. He remains closed until Sunday morning, when he opens his store again
and operates a full day.
A state law forbidding him to work on Sunday is enforced against
him. The entire week-end is now foreclosed to him. He must either work on
Saturday and thus violate his conscience or go out of business and lose his
means of earning a living as well as his capital investment. May he be constitutionally confronted with such a choice? The United States Supreme Court has
recently answered yes.'
During the past century and a half many American courts have sustained
the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws.2 The United States Supreme Court
so concluded in 1951 in the case of Friednian v. People of State of New York'
when it ruled that no substantial federal question was presented by a decision
of New York's highest court that such a law did not interfere with the religious
freedom of a Sabbatarian.4 It should have been no surprise, therefore, that in
1961 the United States Supreme Court, after a plenary hearing, again so decided.' What may have been surprising to some was the closeness of the decision, Justices Douglas, Stewart and Brennan having concluded in three separate
opinions that such laws interfere with the Orthodox Jew's religious freedom.
Before long these laws and the unique problems they create for the Sabbatarian
may again be laid alongside the United States Constitution for scrutiny by the
highest Court of our land.
1961 witnessed a massive legal assault on Sunday closing laws. The laws
of three states, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Massachusetts, were considered by
the Court in four cases. Two cases involved Sabbatarian businessmen.6 The
other two involved discount house operations open seven days a week.' The
principal decisions of the Court relatig to the first amendment's establishment
* B.A., LL.B.; member of the Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Court Bars.
** B.A., LL.B., LL.M.; member of the Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Court
Bars.
1 Braunfeld v. Brown, 81 Sup. Ct. 1144 (1961).
2 See notes 98 and 99 of Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion in McGowan v.
Maryland, 81 Sup. Ct. 1153, 1179 (1961). One 1858 California decision (Ex parte Newman,
9 Cal. 502) held a Sunday closing law unconstitutional, but the same court overruled that
decision three years later in Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678 (1861). With that exception,
such laws have been uniformly upheld.

3

341 U.S. 907 (1951).

4 When used in this article, Sabbatarian means one who observes Saturday as a day
of rest out of religious conviction.
5 McGowan v. Maryland, 81 Sup. Ct. 1101 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market of Mass., 81 Sup. Ct. 1122 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison - Allentown, Inc. v.
McGinley, 81 Sup. Ct. 1135 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 81 Sup. Cit. 1144 (1961).
6 Gallagher and Braunfeld, supra note 5.
7 McGowan and Two Guys, supra note 5.
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and free exercise clauses' were McGowan b. State of Maryland,' (a discount
house case) and Braunfeld v. Brown'0 (a Sabbatarian case). In the McGowan
case, only Justice Douglas dissented.' In the Braunfeld case, Justices Douglas,
Stewart and Brennan dissented."2
This article is a critique of the decisions of the Court in the Sabbatarian
cases.
In the Braunfeld case, the Court had before it plaintiffs' complaint seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Pennsylvania Act and a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants (chief of police and district attorney) alleging that
the complaint failed to state a claim against the defendants upon which relief
could be granted. The principal facts averred by plaintiffs were as follows:
Abraham Braunfeld, an Orthodox Jew, owned and operated a retail store in
which he sold children's clothing, the Sunday sale of which the Pennsylvania
Legislature proscribed.' One who does not observe the Sabbath in accordance
with the Fourth Commandment cannot be an Orthodox Jew. Such observance
of the Sabbath requires a total abstention from business and all manner of
work from nightfall Friday until nightfall Saturday and prohibits the hiring
of other employees, regardless of the faith of such employees, to work during
that same period. Abraham Braunfeld"4 had always closed on Friday night
and Saturday and opened on Sunday. If the Sunday closing law were enforced
against him he would no longer be able to remain in his business and would
lose his capital investment, unless he abandoned Orthodox Judaism 5 and be8 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; ... "
9 Supra note 5.
10 Supra notd 5.
11 McGowan v. Maryland, 81 Sup. Ct. 1218 (1961).
12 Ibid (Justice Douglas); Braunfeld, supra note 5, at 1149 (Justice Brennan) and 1152
(Justice Stewart).
13 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1945) provides:
Selling certain personal property on Sunday.
Whoever engages on Sunday in the business of selling, or sells or offers
for sale, on such day, at retail, clothing and wearing apparel, clothing accessories, furniture, housewares, home, business or office furnishings, household,
business or office appliances, hardware, tools, paints, building and lumber
supply materials, jewelry, silverware, watches, clocks, luggage, musical instruments and recordings, or toys, excluding novelties and souvenirs, shall,
upon conviction thereof in a summary proceeding for the first offense, be
sentenced to pay a fine of not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100.00),
and for the second or any subsequent offense committed within one year
after conviction for the first offense, be sentenced to pay a fine of not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200.00) or undergo imprisonment not exceeding thirty days in default thereof.
Each separate sale or offer to sell shall constitute a separate offense.
Information charging violations of this section shall be brought within
seventy-two hours after the commission of the alleged offense and not thereafter.
14 Abraham Braunfeld was one of the five joint plaintiff-appellants. For the sake of
simplicity only his case will be referred to.
15 It can be dangerous for a lawyer to comment upon the relative importance of various
religious obligations in a given fa~th. Yet it would seem clear that in balancing the needs
of a community against the individual's religious obligations, some such information should
be available to the persons doing the balancing. The following information supports the
pleaded contention that Sabbath observance is primary and central in the scheme of religious observances of the Orthodox Jew:
The scriptural source of the Sabbath institution is Exodus 20:8-11, setting forth
the Fourth Commandment as follows:
Remember the sabbath, to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labor, and
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gan operating on Friday night and Saturday.
. The Court held that the Pennsylvania law did not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment and that its enforcement against Abraham
Braunfeld, despite the consequences, did not interfere with the free exercise
of his religion.
The Decisions of the Court
In the McGowan case the Court conceded the religious origin of Sunday
dosing laws,1 6 but said that "beginning before the eighteenth century, nonreligious arguments for Sunday dosing began to be heard more distinctly and
do all thy work; but the seventh day is a sabbath unto the Lord thy God,
in it thou shalt not do any manner of work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy
daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor
thy stranger that is within thy gates; for in six days the Lord made heaven
and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested on the seventh day;
wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it. THE HOLY
SCRIPTURES,

(THE

JEWISH PUBLICATION

SOCIETY

OF AMERICA,

1917).

Another version of the same Commandment is found in Deut. 5:12-15. The underlying
principles regarding working on the Sabbath will be found in Gem. 2:1-3; Exod. 16:22-30;
Exod. 31:12-17; Exod. 21:13-17; Exod. 34:21; see also, Isa. 58:13,14; Amos 8:4-6; jerem.
17:21,22.
Authorities differ as to the age of the ,Sabbath idea, some believing it was sponsored by
Moses, and others that it does not predate the Babylonian exile (586 B.C.). See 19 ENCYC.
BIT., Sabbath, 787-789 (1950). To all, the great antiquity of the Sabbath idea is beyond
dispute. To the Orthodox Jew, the Fourth Commandment was revealed by God to Moses at
Mount Sinai.
From the days of the Decalouge at least, the Sabbath has been of enormous and undiminished importance to Judaism. The reader is referred to 2 GEORGE FooT MooRE,
JUDAISM IN THE FIRsT CENTURIES OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA. 21-39 (Harv. Univ. Press.
1954); 1 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Seder Mo'ed, Shabbath, Foreword by Dr. J. H. Hertz,
xiiixv Introduction by I. Epstein, xxi-xxvi (The Soncino Press, 1938); GASTER, FESTIVALS OF

YEAR, 263-290 (Sloane 1952). ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA notes (Id. at 787)
that the Fourth Commandment follows immediately upon the commandments which are
concerned with God's name, indicating in the words of the contributor," . . . how great must
have been the importance of the Sabbath . . . The emphasis . . . is the more noteworthy in
view of the fact that it ignores all the other feasts and rites."
Traditional Jews have by their aotions - even by giving up their lives - demonstrated
their belief that they "must observe the Sabbath throughout their generations, for a perpetual covenant" (Exod. 21:16). Antiochus Epiphanes sought to abolish the Sabbath, and
the Jews at the beginning of the Maccabean revolt allowed themselves to be massacred in
even in self-defense (MOORE, Op. Cit. supra,
cold blood rather than profane the Sabbath -

THE JEWISH

at 26). Afterwards, defensive warfare was deemed permissible on the Sabbath [SEGAL, THE
SABBATH BooK, 108, 206, 207 (Thomas Yoseloff 1957)]. .

One of the great Jewish scholars of recent times said that, "[W]ithout the observance
of the Sabbath, of the olden Sabbath, of the Sabbath as perfected by the Rabbis, the whole
of Jewish life would in time disappear." Dr. J. H. Hertz, the late Chief Rabbi of England,

in his

COMMENTARIES TO THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS,

298 (Soncino Press 1952).

The following comments point up the generally accepted belief among traditional Jews for
the past several millenia that the survival of Judaism is inextricably bound up with the con-

tinued virility of the Sabbath institution:

Achad Ha'am, 19th century Jewish writer: "Far more than Israel has kept the Sabbath,

it is the Sabbath that has kept Israel." Quoted by Dr. Hertz in his commentaries to THE
AuTHoRIzED DAILY PRAYER Boox (Rev. ed.) 341 (Bloch Publ. Co., 1948).
Maimonides: "The institution of the Sabbath and the prohibition against idolatry are
The Sabbath is also a sign
each equal in importance to all the other laws of the Torah ...
between the Holy One, blessed be He! and us forever." 10 JEwIsH ENCYC., Sabbath 598 (Funk

& Wagnalls Co. 1905).

Abraham Joshua Heschel, modem Jewish scholar: "There are few ideas in the world
of thought which contain so much spiritual power as the idea of the Sabbath. Aeons hence,
when of many of our cherished theories only shreds will remain, that cosmic tapestry will continue to shine. Eternity utters a day."

16

McGowan, supra note 5, at 1108, 1109.
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the statutes began to lose some of their totally religious flavor."1 Today, the
purpose of these laws is "to set one day apart from all others as a day of rest,
repose, recreation and tranquility - a day which all members of the family
and community have the opportunity to spend and enjoy together .. . - s
The Court said that "people of all religions and people with no religion regard
Sunday as a time for family activity, for visiting friends and relatives, for latesleeping, for passive and active entertainment, for dining out and the like. *
The cause is irrelevant; the fact exists. ***,19
In the Court's view, the establishment clause did not ban regulations of
conduct "whose reason or effect merely happen to coincide or harmonize with
the tenets of some or all religions."" The Court felt that most Sunday closing
laws as presently written "are of a secular rather than of a religious character"
and that "[P]resently they bear no relationship to establishment of religion as
those words are used in the Constitution of the United States."'"
In the Braunfeld case, the Court recognized that the laws constituted an
economic burden upon the appellants and faced the question of whether the
Constitution forbids application of the Sunday laws to Sabbatarians2 2 The
Court noted that while "The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions
is absolute, . . . the freedom to act, even when the action is in accord with
one's religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions. 2' The
Court cited the polygamy and child labor laws as examples of legislative power
that may legitimately affect actions even though these actions are religiously
required.24 The Court noted that in the cases involving laws against polygamy
and child labor, the religious practices themselves conflicted with the public
interest while in the dosing law cases the law does not make unlawful any religious practice of the appellants. 25 In the view of the Court, the Sunday closing laws merely operate ". . . to make the practice of their religious beliefs
more expensive."2 6 The Court thus considered the burden on the appellants to
be an "indirect" one. Then the Court said, "to strike down, without the most
critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the
exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious
practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.
The Court considered income tax statutes which limit the amount of charitable
deductions to be comparable "indirect" burdens. Likewise the Court considered
statutes which require the courts to be closed on Saturday and Sunday as they
affect the observance of the religion of a trial lawyer whose religion requires him
to rest on a weekday, to be further examples of indirect burdens. The Court
concluded that "if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law with17
18
19

Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1118, 1119.

20 Id. at 1113.
21

Id. at 1115.

22 Braunfeld, supra note 5, at 1145,1146.
23 Id. at 1146.
24 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1949); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.

145(1878).
25 Braunfeld, supra note 5, at 1147.
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 1148.
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in its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance
unless the state may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose
such a burden."2
Establishment and Free Exercise
The analytical method employed by the Court was to consider whether
the Sunday closing laws violate the establishment clause in the abstract, i.e.,
separate and apart from and without reference to the effect that they may
have upon the Sabbatarian; and to consider whether the laws violate the Sabbatarians' free exercise of religion separate and apart from and without reference to the historical relationship such laws have with Christianity and the
benefits Christianity derives from them. Such an analysis is incomplete in a case
involving an allegation of a type of preferential treatment which by its very
nature includes aspects of establishment and aspects of interference with free
exercise in combination.
Justice Frankfurter in his separate opinion said,
Within the discriminating phraseology of the First Amendment, distinction has been drawn between cases raising "establishment" and
"free exercise" questions. Any attempt to formulate a bright-line
distinction is bound to founder. In view of the competition among
religious creeds, whatever
"establishes" one sect disadvantages an29
other, and vice versa.
Anyone who has considered carefully the first amendment as it relates to Sunday closing laws must agree with Justice Frankfurter. Nevertheless he, and
apparently the Chief Justice too, felt that it would help analytically "to isolate in general terms the two largely overlapping areas of concern reflected in
the two constitutional phrases, 'establishment' and 'free exercise' . . . .""0 The
result of such isolated consideration was that the Court never reached the
crux of the unique problem posed by Sunday dosing laws, i.e., the radical
change wrought by these laws in the interrelationship between Sunday and
Saturday-observing faiths.
It may be that present-day Sunday closing laws are not religious laws, but
having said that much it should not follow that like any other secular regulation - like the limitations on charitable deductions under the Internal Revenue Code 1 - they are valid despite their "indirect burden on the exercise of
religion."32 In considering whether such laws may constitutionally be applied
to a Sabbath observer it is not enough to decide that they are no longer reli28 Ibid.
29 McGowan v. Maryland, 81 Sup. Ct. 1153, 1155 (1961)
Frankfurter.)

(Separate opinion of Justice

30 Ibid.
31 If there is any logic whatever in acclaim that such limitations interfere with the free
exercise of religion, then would it not follow that a tax on a clergyman's income is likewise
invalid? There is of course no logic in such a claim. Unlike tax laws, which are truly secular,
Sunday laws accommodate - and intentionally accommodate - the great Christian majority.
That is why Sunday is selected. Having accommodated one-fifth, the others deserve equal
accomodation.

32 Braunfeld, supra note 5, at 1147.
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gious laws; their connection with Christianity, even if not amounting to an
establishment, is nonetheless enormously relevant to the determination of the
free exercise question. Conversely their continuing adverse effect upon competing faiths - no less now that they have "evolved" into secular regulations
than when they were admittedly religious laws - is pertinent in deciding the
establishment question.
Almost seventeen hundred years ago Emperor Constantine promulgated the
first Sunday law as part of his program of empire unification by means of
the establishment of Christianity. 33 From that day until fairly recently, Sunday
legislation has been religious in origin and purpose. Thus Sunday legislation in
321 A.D. was among the first progeny of the marriage of the Christian Church
and the state and was viewed in the same light during most of the ensuing
sixteen centuries. It may well be, as both the Chief Justice?4 and Justice Frankfurter35 point out at great length, that the rationale for present-day Sunday
closing laws is primarily secular; 6 that "beginning before the 18th century,
non-religious arguments for Sunday closing began to be heard more distinctly
and statutes began to lose some of their totally religious flavor."3 7 It may well
be that the state by enacting Sunday closing laws today "seeks to set one day
apart from all other as . . . a day in which there exists relative quiet and disassociation from the every day intensity of commercial activities, a day in which
people may visit friends and relatives who are not available during working
days."3' But it is equally important not to lose sight of the fact that the Sunday closing law of today was made possible by sixteen centuries of state-imposed religious observance of Sunday as a day of rest; that Sunday rather than
Tuesday or Saturday is selected today in order to accommodate the vast Christian majority of citizens; that Christianity benefits very substantially from this
selection by having obtained the help of the state in preserving Sunday as a
day of rest. Even if, in the view of the Supreme Court, such laws do not necessarily violate the establishment clause, any complete anlysis of the constitutionality of these laws as applied to Sabbatarians must take proper account of
the substantial aid which such laws have been and still are, intentionally- or
incidentally, to Christianity.
The first amendment had many objectives. It was meant to protect citizens from the political tyranny which combinations of church and state had produced in the past;39 it was meant to protect the individual in his right to believe or disbelieve. It was most certainly meant to protect the right of any religious group to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal
33 CROSS, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 334, 335 (Oxford
Univ. Pr. 1957); 21 ENCYC. BRIT. Sunday, 565 (1950). See JOHNSON & YOST, SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 219, 290 (Univ. of Minn. Press. 1948).
34 McGowan, supra note 5, at 1109-1112.
35 McGowan, supra note 29, at 1161-1166 and 1169-1178.
36 Although the rationale may be secular, it cannot be denied that the recent wave of
Sunday closing laws is attributable to the active cooperation of religious elements, particularly Sunday observing groups, and urban commercial interests.
37 McGowan, supra note 5, at 1109.
38 Id. at 1118.
39 Id. at 1107.
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of its dogma," and to keep the government "neutral when it comes to competi40
tion between sects."1
Indeed, one of the few noncontroversial interpretations of the first amendment is that it prohibits preference of one religion over another. Perhaps Sunday closing laws, despite the obvious aid that they give to Christianity, are not
preferential when they are not enforced against Sabbatarians; perhaps such
aid can be rationalized legitimately as the accidental or incidental by-product
of valid secular legislation, even though Sabbatarian faiths have not been so
benefited and must rely on traditional methods of moral suasion to protect
the holiness of their day. Perhaps Christianity has just been lucky. Justice Frankfurter in his separate opinion said that it is reasonable to expect a state to select
Sunday because any other day "would not be seconded, as is Sunday legislation, by the community's moral temper."4 1 It is possible then to say that just
as the secular aspects of Sunday laws are seconded by the "moral temper" of
the Christian community, religious aspects of Sunday as the day of rest are
quite coincidentally seconded by the state's selection of Sunday. Both parties
have been fortunate in this coincidence, but their aims are deemed to be entirely separate aims, one secular and the other religious. But let there be no
mistake about it - even those Sunday laws which exempt Sabbatarians are of
great benefit to Christianity, and "in view of the competition among religious
creeds" to the extent that one sect is benefited, the other is disadvantaged. Sunday is protected; Saturday is not. The seeds of an establishment are there. But
when such a law is applied to Sabbatarians as well and they too must rest
on Sunday and are denied the productive use of the entire week-end, 42 then the
combination of incidental help to one party and hindrance to the other is
preferential far beyond the disadvantage one party would naturally sustain by
virtue of an advantage granted to his competitor.
In other words establishment cannot be isolated from free exercise in the
analysis of a case which involves an allegation of preferential treatment, because preferential treatment by its very nature involves a combination of both
the establishment and free exercise clauses. The determination of whether there
has been a preference demands consideration of the sum total effect of a law
from the point of view of both how much it aids one faith and how much
40 Zorach v. Clauson, 342 U.S. 313, 314 (1952).

41 McGowan, supra note 29, at 1178, 1179.
42 The Sabbath observer whose trade brings him within the proscription of the Pennsylvania Act is able to conduct his retail business only from Monday morning until mid-afternoon on Friday. A retail businessman cannot realistically be expected to operate profitably
on a four and one-half day week, when the other two and one-half days happen to be
the entire week-end. Appellants in Braunfeld did not go to their customers. They had to

wait -for customers to come to them. And to customers in our society, week-ends have become prime shopping time.
The competitive disadvantage to Sabbath observers inherent in the statute is especially
great - probably fatal - for the appellants in Braunfeld. They were not in trades catermg exclusively to Jewish customers, such as were the kosher butchers in Friedman v. New
York, 341 U.S. 907 (1951), whose competitors likewise closed on the Jewish Sabbath.
Braunfeld sold children's clothing, shoes, draperies and slip covers, in open and immediate
competition with others who operated on Friday night and Saturday. It is fair to assume
that if the appellants were closed on Sunday, most of their Sunday customers would have
bought elsewhere on Friday night or Saturday.
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it hinders the others. It was this combination which the United States Supreme
Court failed to consider.
The majority of sects in the United States observe Sunday; others, in direct competition with them for adherents, observe Saturday. Even assuming that
the purpose of the legislation is not to protect Christianity, the end result is
the same - the competition is no longer free or fair. One faith is helped and
the other faith is not only denied that help, but is prosecuted for not respecting
a day which it does not consider holy. When Sabbatarians are compelled to
observe separate secular and religious. days of rest, and all others have the
political strength to make the two coincide, the Sabbatarian faiths are not being
permitted to flourish in accordance with "the zeal of their adherents and the
appeal of their dogma." 3 .Obviously, such laws hamper Sabbatarian faiths in
their efforts to win new adherents and to retain old ones.
Thus we have the unique result that both the aid to Christianity and the
burden on Sabbatarians were justified by the Court by the fact that they are
incidental to the primary purpose of the law. The writers suggest that the
United States Supreme Court has permitted the ultimate purpose of the constitutional guarantee - to let each religion flourish or decay, and to compete
with other religions, on its own merits - to be dashed upon the slippery shoals
of "motive" and "intent."
The Court Balanced Inapplicable Interests
The majority opinion in the Braunfeld case did not come to grips with
the problem of what standard ought to be applied in judging the constitutionality
of this kind of law. Clearly the Court did not use any particularly exacting
standard. Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in the Braunfeld case quite
accurately complained that the majority failed to give even a "deferential nod
towards that high place which we have accorded religious freedom in the past.""
Perhaps that is not so important. We learn more about the real value of religious freedom in our society by examining the types of cases in which the Court
has permitted legislative incursions into that freedom than we do from the various articulations of applicable standards. 5
Until the Sunday closing law cases, it was indeed an extreme case that
would limit religious freedom. For example, to many Mormons accepted doctrine required male members to practice polygamy. This duty was enjoined by
different books - including the Holy Bible - which those Mormons believed
to be of divine origin, and they believed also that polygamy was required by
the direct request of Almighty God in a revelation to Joseph Smith, their
founder and prophet. The Supreme Court,46 not doubting the bona fides of
that belief, nevertheless sustained a conviction for bigamy because the real
danger of permitting the practice to continue was quite evident. The Court

said,
Supra note 40.
Braunfeld, supra note 5, at 1151.
See discussion of the inherent limitation upon rules as implements of justice in law,
in CAHN, SENSE OF INJUSTicE 32-39 (New York Univ. Press. 1949).
46 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
43
44
45
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[A]ccording as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed,
do we find the principles in which the Government of the People
to a greater or less extent rests. *** (Polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities
fetters the people in stationary despotism, while the principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.47
Indeed, in Cleveland et al. v. United States, 4 the Court considered the
practice of polygamy to be a "return to barbarism," saying that "The permanent advertisement of their existence is an example of the sharp repercussions
49
which they have in the community."
0
In Davis v. Beason," the fallacy of. granting absolute religious freedom to
such sects was exposed when the Court said,
There have been sects which denied as a part of their religious
tenets that there should be any marriage tie, and advocated promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, as prompted by the passion of
its members. And history discloses the fact that the necessity of
human sacrifices, on special occasions, has been a tenet of many
sects. Should a sect of either of these kind ever find its way into
this country, swift punishment would follow the carrying into effect
of its doctrines, and no heed would be given to the pretense that,
as religious beliefs, their supporters could be protected
in their
51
exercise by the Constitution of the United States.
In Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,", prosecution followed
the refusal and neglect to comply with the statutory requirement of vaccination
against smallpox. While Jacobson did not raise religious infringement as a
defense, he argued that the statute interfered with his liberty. The Court
held that it was within the police power of local government to protect its ctizens against contagious diseases. The result could hardly have been otherwise
even if a religious scruple had been involved. The law cannot permit an entire
community to be endangered by the refusal of certain persons to be immunized
against contagious diseases. The case is a perfect example of a danger both
clear and present - of a tragic clash between the desperate needs of a community and the convictions of a man.
Other examples quickly come to mind.
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part
of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil
government in which he lived could not interfere to prevent the
sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed in burning herself upon
the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the
power of the 53civil government to prevent her carrying her belief
into practice?
54 the religious pracA closer case.was presented in Prince v. Massachusetts,
tice involved was the distribution of Watch Tower magazines on the streets
by young children, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, in conformity with
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 165, 166.
329 U.S. 14 (1946).
Id. at 19.
133 U.S. 33 (1890).
Id. at 343. See also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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the scripture, "A little child shall lead them." The laws of Massachusetts forbade girls under the age of 18 to sell magazines or periodicals on the street.
The importance of laws protecting young children from being forced by their
custodians to labor is obvious and the case presented a difficult question of
balancing the religious freedom of the custodian and of the child against the
interest of society in protecting various other interests of the child. The United
States Supreme Court, while suggesting that if an adult rather than a child
were involved the result would be different, held that the statute was constitutional as applied to a child, Justice Murphy dissenting.
But in the Braunfeld case the Court was not dealing with "a return to
barbarism" as polygamy has been described, or the refusal to become immunized
against a highly contagious disease, or attempts at human sacrifice or with the
religious compulsions of women who burn themselves on the pile of their dead
husbands. It was rather dealing with an institution - the Sabbath - as
ancient as Judaism," and which Orthodox Jews believe to be at the core of
their religion which is so much a part of Western civilization. It is an institution out of which grew Sunday observance among Christians56 as well as the
very statutes which Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Maryland enacted and
which were challenged before the United States Supreme Court. All that was
under consideration was the right of five traditional Jews profitably to operate
modest and orderly businesses and to continue in the faith of their fathers,
without having to make a state-imposed choice between the two.
Although all of the foregoing cases illustrate that religious freedom is not
absolute and can be impaired, they also illustrate better than any shorthand
phrase such as "clear and present danger" could, the extreme circumstances
required before the Supreme Court would, in the past, permit any incursion into
religious liberty. Until the 1961 decisions, the social needs which have justified
an impairment of religious liberty have been enormously compelling. This reflected the high estate which religious freedom enjoyed as one of the basic,
fundamental and underlying values in America, distinguishing our way of life
from that in many other lands. What is most disturbing about the decisions of
1961 is that the Court permitted an infringement of religious liberty for virtually no societal need at all.
The question is, what would it have cost society to permit the Sabbatarian
to continue operating on Sunday? Arguably, it might be proper to permit the
burden - the clog, as Justice Brennan called it" - upon the Sabbatarian's
religious freedom if the alternative were a society without a community day of
rest, and without the attendant social benefits noted by the Court. That is
55 See supra, note 15.
56 Yet the Jewish Sabbath and the Christian Sunday are
ception or in manner of observance. "Paul from the first days
it down definitely that the Jewish Sabbath was not binding
BRIT., Sabbath, 787-789 (1950). Sunday became the Lord's
set apart for worship n memory of the Resurrection. See 21
(1950).
57 Braunfeld, supra note 5 at 1151.

not the same either in conof Gentile Christianity, laid
on Christians." 19 ENcYc.
Day in Christianity, a day
ENCYC. BRIT., Sunday, 565
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how the Court balanced the competing interests presented to it."" But obviously
these were' not the interests confronting one another. It is not necessary to preserve the Sabbatarian's first amendment freedoms at the expense of the community at large, and the case should not have been decided as though this
were the choice.
If the Court had held that the Sunday closing law while not unconstitutional on its face, could not be applied to Sabbatarians, there would still have
been a community day of rest with all of the attendant social benefits noted
by the Court diminished to some very small extent by the fact that the law
could not constitutionally be applied to Sabbatarians. It is this diminution of
the social consequences arising out of the community Sunday, and not a deprivation of all those consequences, which should have been weighed against the
infringement of religious liberty. The writers submit that the change in the
nature of Sunday and in its social significance to the great majority, if the law
were not applied to Sabbatarians, would be virtually imperceptible. And to
permit an infringement of religious liberty for such slender needs is at variance
with the high estate that freedom has been given in every relevant decision of
the United States Supreme Court and indeed with the language used by the
Court in exalting religious freedom in these very cases.
Analogously, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,59 the Court balanced
the right of a state to pass legislation "of general scope not directed against
doctrinal loyalties of particular sects ' against the right of one child, on religious grounds, to refuse to salute the flag. But inapplicable competing interests
were weighed. Against that child's rights should have been weighed only "the
inconveniences which may attend some sensible adjustment of school discipline."'" Three years later, in the Barnette62 case, the Minersville decision was
overruled.
58 Indeed the Chief Justice's opinion in Braunfeld goes further. He holds that because
the burden on Braunfeld's religious freedom is "indirect" rather than "direct" (i.e., the
law does not directly compel him to work on Saturday but only indirectly may achieve
that result by stopping him from working on Sunday), the law is valid so long as its "purpose and effect" is "to advance the State's secular goals." Braunfeld, supra note 5 at 1148.
Justice Frankfurter 'however explicitly weighs the completing interest in McGowan, supra
note 29, at 1186, as follows:
The remaining question is whether the importance to the public of
those ends is sufficient to outweigh the restraint upon the religious exercise of Orthodox Jewish practice which the restriction entails. See Prince
v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88
L.Ed. 645; Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct.
762, 85 L.Ed. 1049. The nature of the legislative purpose is the preservation of a traditional institution which assures to the community a time
during which the mind and body are released from the demands and distractions of an increasingly mechanized and competition-driven society.
The right to this release has been claimed by workers and by small enterprisers, especially by retail merchandisers, over centuries, and finds contemporary expression in legislation in three-quarters of the States. The
nature of the injury which must be balanced against it is the economic
disadvantage to the enterpriser, and the inconvenience to the consumer,
which Sunday regulations impose upon those who choose to adhere to
the Sabbatarian tenets of their faith.
59 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
60 Id. at 594.
61 Id. at 606 (dissent of Justice Stone).
62 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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In justifying a state's decision not to exempt Sabbatarians, the Court accepted rationalizations which do not have even tissue substance. The possibilities
that the least profitable day of the week might become the "religous" day of
rest for some and that a "state-conducted inquiry" would be required,6 3 simply
do not realistically exist. The Court was asked to declare the law unconstitutional as applied to specific Sabbatarians who could establish the bona fides
of their adherance to a faith whose history spans four millenia. Should a
"Wednesditarian" also wish to be exempt, he would have to stand before the
bar of a court and prove by sworn testimony that his convictions are sincerely
held and not merely a transient adjustment for purposes of economic advantage.
The burden would be his, not the State's. Surely a first amendment freedom
should not be infringed because of such a "possibility."
The Court in the Braunfeld case developed a principle new to the first,
might have to require Sabbatarian employers "to hire employees who themselves qualified for exemption because of their own religious beliefs." 4 But why
shouldn't employees who would otherwise be able to work to support themselves only from Monday to Friday afternoon have such an opportunity to be
relieved from economic pressure to violate their Sabbath? The Sabbatarian's
week-day employees would not have to be selected on that basis.
Lastly, the Court expressed concern over the economic advantage Sunday
retailers might have over their competitors,65 citing the Parliamentary Debates
in England although there exists a long history here in the United States of a
dozen States66 with Sabbatarian exemptions in their Sunday closing laws. This
long history gives no support whatever to the theory that a Sunday retailer would
be at a competitive advantage. Unlike the fraudulent "Wednesditarian" the

Sabbatarian does not give up the least profitable day of the week - he gives
up the most profitable day and evening. A first amendment case requires an
inquiry by the Court into the substantiality of the reasons advanced for the infringement. Substance is here lacking not only because the history in the twelve

States gives it no support, but also because the very small number of Sabbatarians who open on Sunday have always opened on Sunday, frequently in business areas where the other stores close and have always been at a serious economic
disadvantage despite their Sunday operation, as could have been amply demon-

strated at trial.
First amendment freedoms are not absolute and religious liberty may be
curtailed if the countervailing needs of society are legitimate and are weighty
and compelling enough. But surely religious freedom cannot be one of the
great values which distinguishes our way of life from others if it can be set
aside for virtually no social needs at all.
Braunfeld, supra note 5, at 1149.
Ibid.
Ibid.
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 8609 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38, § 549; IND.
STAT. ANN. § 10-4301 (1933); IowA CODE ANN. § 720 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
436.160 (1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 121, § 360 (1954); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.855
(1957); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 13045 (Page 1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 909
(1951); VA. CODE ANN. § 18330 (1950); W. VA. -CODE ANN. § 6073 (1955); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 351.52 (1959).
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Direct v. Indirect Interference
The Court in the Braunfeld case developed a principle new to the first
amendment by drawing a distinction between what it called "direct" and "indirect" burdens on religious observance. The Court said that a law which makes
unlawful a religious practice would directly interfere with religious liberty
whereas a law which "does not make unlawful any religious practices" but
which "operates so as to make the practice of . . .religious beliefs more ex-

pensive" is merely an indirect burden on religious observance." The result of
this distinction was made clear in the Chief Justice's opinion. In the case of
indirect burdens, no special standards will be applied by the Court nor will
there even be a balancing of the interest of society and the individual's liberty.
The Court said, "If the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within
its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals,
the statute is valid, despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless
the State many accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such
a burden." '8
Justice Holmes once said, "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that
ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis."8 9 It is to be hoped that this unfortunate distinction between direct and indirect burdens on religious freedom will be quickly reexamined and discarded.
Concerning religious freedom, Justice Murphy said, "Reflection has convinced me that as a judge I have no loftier duty or responsibility than to uphold
that spiritual freedom to its farthest reaches."7 The distinction the Court drew
between direct and indirect limitations on religious freedom has neither the
clarity nor the general applicability of a lasting constitutional principle. Applied
across the board, it would permit of all kinds of burdens - laws taxing religious
observance, for example - which do not make unlawful the religious practice
itself.
Ultimately, a statute's consonance with religious freedom can be measured
only one way: By the degree of voluntarism, of freedom, in religious choice before and after the statute. Is it not the statutory compulsion to rest on Sunday
which makes it more likely that Sabbatarian businessmen will begin to work
on Saturday, thus abandoning their Sabbath observance and their faith?
In Follett v. Town of McCormick,7 the Court struck down an ordinance
requiring a $15.00 per annum license fee of agents selling books, as applied to
a Jehovah's Witness. In that case, the community imposed a tax upon all businesses and professions and, once paid, there was absolutely no discretion in any
governmental agency or personnel to withhold the license. Thus, there was
no attempt to single out any religious group, nor did the legislation leave open
the door to administrative abuse. And it must be noted. that the burden was
"indirect," i.e., it did not-make unlawful the religious practice.
67
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Braunfeld, supra note 5, at 1147.
Id. at 1148.
Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912).
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943).
321 U.S. 573 (1944).
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Which of the two statutes, the Follett case statute or the instant one, more
effectively limits religious choice or voluntarism? Indeed, ordinances like those
in the Follett case are struck down not because they tend to compel anyone to
give up his faith - they clearly do not - but because even though a $15.00
tax may contain no such compulsion, $1,000.00 tax does, and the difference is
only in degree. But Sunday closing laws do not merely contain the seed of
future possible compulsion; rather they will effect an immediate compulsion.
The choice of going out of business or giving up their faith faces Sabbatarian
businessmen immediately upon the enforcement of these laws.
The Effect of the Decisions
The Sunday closing law decisions will have the effect of radically restricting
the ability of Jewish and Christian Sabbatarians to observe the seventh day as
a day of rest in accordance with the biblical commandment and to convince
their children to do likewise. Aside from this obvious restriction of religious
liberty, the decisions were a victory for those who view America as a vast melting
pot, as against those who see positive values in our continuing to be a culturally
pluralistic or diverse people. It may seriously be questioned, for example,
whether the emerging cultural patterns of suburbanites, patterns cutting clear
across ethnic, religious and class lines, ought to be the subject matter of legislative
power."2 The habit of "whole family" shopping on Sunday for family purchases
at massive shopping centers and discount houses certainly cannot be deemed
inherently bad from a purely secular point of view, and one has the feeling
that in the legislative battle involving on the one hand supporters of the suburban
discount operations and on the other hand supporters of the established downtown economic interests,' the interests and desires of the families who choose
to shop on Sunday are singularily unrepresented. Likewise, the Sabbatarian is
not and does not want to become a part of the larger economic struggle between
emerging and established economic interests. What has caused him and his
forebears for generations before him to live a lifetime of "business as usual"
Sundays has nothing to do with the new cultural trends of mid-twentieth century. Sunday business has become a way of life for him; a cultural manifestation of his efforts to support his family without sacrificing sacred beliefs. Sunday
work in his weekday trade is not a religious duty, but it is a way of life that
developed because of his religion."' "The essential characteristic of these [first
amendment] liberties is that under their shield, many types of life, character,
opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this
72 To freeze by law a rapidly changing cultural pattern not heading in dangerous directions is unwise if not unconstitutional. This thought was expressed by contemporary
philosopher Horace Kallen, CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE AMERICAN IDEA (Univ. of Pa.
Press, 1956) when he said (p. 55):
. . . whatever stays truly always and everywhere the same stays null and
dead. What exists and lives, struggles to go on doing so, and its struggle
is its change. A living culture is a changing culture . . .
73 See Note, 73 HARv. L. REV. 729, 730, 731 (1960).
74 For descriptions of the unique way of life developed by Orthodox Jews as a result
of their interpretation of the Fourth commandment, see Dr. Hertz' Foreward to the Shabbath tractate of the Babylonian Talmud, op. cit. supra, note 15, at p. xv; MooRE op. cit.
supra, note 15, at pp. 34-39; SILVER, WHERE JUDAISM DIFFERED, 92 (Jewish Publ. Soc.
1957).
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shield more necessary than in our own country for a people composed of many
races and of many creeds." 5 Should the "type of life" thereby developed by
Orthodox Jews, harming no one, be outlawed by a state legislature, and should
the State be permitted to do away with these diverse cultural patterns in the
interest of "enforced Sunday togetherness?"" 6
Religious and ethnic differences have become obliterated in this vast land
with amazing rapidity (to the great satisfaction of some. and the consternation
of others) without the aid of legal compulsion. The fondest hopes of some historians and philosophers of forty years ago,77 that the democratic atmosphere
on these shores would permit of the fullest flowering of many diverse ethnic cultures, have been shattered" with the mobility of our people and fluidity of
social change - without .the force that is law. For better or for worse, our
people, our religions and our cultures are becoming in more and more ways
indistinguishable.7 9 Those few who wish to retain their distinctive way of life
should be permitted to try without legal hindrance, and to try to influence
others, including their children and later generations that their ways are best.
It can be argued that not only religious pluralism, but cultural differences
too come under the protective wings of the Constitution. No other rationale
suggests itself for the unanimous opinions of the United States Supreme Court in
Meyer v. State of Nebraska," in which a statute prohibiting the teaching of
foreign languages to students who had not completed eight grades, was declared
unconstitutional; and in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"' in which it was held
that a state could not compel all children to go to public school."2 Justice
McReynolds said in the Pierce case, "The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all government in this union reposes excludes any general power of the
State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers.""3
The legislative action complained of in the above cited cases and in
Farringtonv. Tokushige 4 and Bartels v. State of Iowa 5 have one thing in common - they are all attempts at cultural unification. Horace Kallen, an eminent
contemporary philosopher, has -said,
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Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
Dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart in Braunfeld, supra note 5 at 1153.
See, for example, KALLEN, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES;
STUDIES IN THE GROUP PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLES (Boni and Liverright
1924), particularly pp. 115, 118-121.
78 Compare the hopes of Kallen, ibid, with the facts actually emerging, as described
by historian Oscar Handlin, The American People In The Twentieth Century, Ch. VIII,
p. 186, et seq. (Harv. Univ. Press 1954).
79 For a study of the impact of the majority culture on several small, insular Jewish
communities, see Ben Kaplan, THE ETERNAL STRANGER: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF JEWISH LIFE IN THE SMALL COMMUNITY

(1957).

80 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
81 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
82 It should be noted that the State'legislature did not outlaw religious school attendance at times not conflicting with public school attendance.
83 Pierce v. Society of Sisters. supra note 81, at 535. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE

6, note 3 (N.Y. Univ. Press 1949) appears to take another view of this case. He char-

acterizes it as a vestige of a time, before 1937, when the Supreme Court promoted its
economic and social prejudices to the rank of immutable natural laws.
84 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
85 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
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Fundamentally, . [cultural unification] would require complete
nationalization of education, the abolition of every form of parochial and private school, the abolition of instruction in other tongues
than English and the concentration of the teaching of history
and literature upon the English tradition. The other institutions of
society would require treatment analogous to that administered by
Germany to her European acquisitions.8"
Most of these have been attempted. Consistently, until the 1961 Sunday closing
laws cases, the United States Supreme Court has struck down such attempts at
cultural unification.
A constitutional basis for especially exacting judicial scrutiny of attempts
to legislate away cultural differences, is suggested in the now famous Footnote 4
of United States v. Carolene Products Company." There, Justice Stone enunciated the "rational basis" standard of constitutionality and then qualified it by
saying:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. *** Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious
*.. national . . . or racial minorities. ***88
As a practical matter it can fairly be said that if Jewish and Christian Sabbatarians together amounted to really substantial numbers, their accumulated
weight could make itself felt and such Sunday closing laws might well not pass.
If a common day of rest could not on that account be attained, the legislature
would find some other way of attacking the problems presumably existing. It
might, for example, require businesses to close on one day or the other and
provide exemptions for those very few here in the United States whose religion
requires that they rest on some other weekday. By doing so, no one would be
prejudiced and everyone would have adequate rest and time to withdraw from
the hurly-burly of worldly cares. It is true that if this were the law and if there
were very substantial numbers of Sabbatarians, there would still be lacking something which the proponents of this type of legislation insist is important - the
sense of community repose of which the Court spoke. But this is the price we
would have to pay for living in a pluralistic society. And there is no real question but that if half our citizens were Sabbatarians, the legislature would be
prepared to pay that price, and we would have no Sunday closing laws of the
type that exist today. The difference then is in numbers - Sabbath observers
are few enough to be at the mercy of an overwhelming majority, acting through
its legislature.
86 KALLEN, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 119 (Boni and Liverright, 1924).
87 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
88 Id. at 152. And see Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, at 605 and 606
(1940) ("And until now we have not hesitated similarly to scrutinize legislation restricting
the civil liberty of racial and religious minorities, although no political process was affected . . .").
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Postscript

Having now completed this article on a complex subject, the writers wish
to add - as a postscript - their conviction that articles on this and related
subjects, popularized perhaps, would be of far greater value in a lay periodical
than in a law journal. There are so many current unresolved problems involving the first amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses: Blue Laws,
Bible reading, prayers and carols in public schools; federal aid to education;.
birth control laws; religious oaths for public office - the list is almost endless.
And these problems, while of course they are of great concern to lawyers, are
of no greater concern to them than to every citizen. Moreover, since legislators
and judges are human and subject to one degree or another to the force of
public opinion - at the very least living, working and breathing in the same
atmosphere affected by that public sentiment - the outcome of all these issues
depends in some measure on the opinions of the general public. And we tend to
forget that while the first amendment is supposed to protect the basic freedoms
of even the smallest minority, it is an amendment which can be repealed or
amended when enough people wish it. Somehow, one can't help feeling that
the analysis of these great problems has become the private domain of judges,
theologians and lawyers - and at that only a small group of lawyers.
We are foolish - those of us on both sides of these vitally important questions - if we fail to bring the discussion into the public domain,89 to the very
people who will, after all is said and done, decide.

89 Professor Edmond Cahn made- a real contribution to public discussion of the very
subject matter of this article by his highly interesting and popularized How To Destroy
The Churches, Harpers, Nov. 1961, pp. 33-39.

